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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The key holding of the United States Supreme Court in Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael1 is that a federal trial judges gatekeeping 
function under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as enunci-
ated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 applies to all 
expert testimony, not just scientific testimony.3 The Court further 
ruled that the four factors it identified in Daubert may apply to the 
testimony of experts outside of scientific testimony,4 but these reli-
ability factors are not to be regarded as definitive checklists or tests: 
Dauberts list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applies to all experts or in every case.5 Accordingly, federal judges 
                                                                                                                      
 * Law Clerk, Justice Major B. Harding, Supreme Court of Florida. B.S., Lehigh 
University, 1983; M.B.A., Lehigh University, 1984; J.D., with High Honors, Florida State 
University College of Law, 2000.  
 The Author wishes to thank the members and staff of the Florida State University Law 
Review for their assistance with this Note and, in particular, Lou Wright, Office Manager, 
for her valuable assistance and dedication to the Law Review. 
 1. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3. See Kumho, 526 U.S. 141. 
 4. See id. at 147. 
 5. Id. at 141. 
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are now gatekeepers when it comes to deciding the admissibility of 
all expert evidence and, apparently, may utilize whatever reliability 
guidelines they choose. Lumping all experts together (be they scien-
tific or nonscientific) under the Daubert regime of reliability, how-
ever, has enormous potential for causing considerable chaos in the 
federal courts.  
 Since there is no consistent methodology as to when, where, and 
how to employ Daubert factors to nonscientific testimony, the genu-
ine likelihood exists that different federal trial courts in different ju-
risdictions will resolve similar matters involving the same nonscien-
tific expert testimony in diametrically opposite ways; inconsistent 
processes will surely yield inconsistent results. Moreover, trial courts 
now have broad latitude as to how to go about their reliability de-
terminations for nonscientific testimony. The applicable abuse-of-
discretion standard, frequently bolstered by harmless error analysis, 
makes the trial courts reliability determination essentially irreversi-
ble. Indeed, it appears that Kumho has left the trial courts and liti-
gants with more questions than answers. 
 Furthermore, the very nature of nonscientific expert testimony, 
which is based on personal experience, observations, skills, training, 
etc.and not on complex scientific principlesmakes it more condu-
cive to evaluation by the jury. Accordingly, a strong judicial gate-
keeper can come dangerously close to infringing upon the jurys tra-
ditional and constitutional obligation as the sole trier of fact. Nonsci-
entific evidence excluded because of an overzealous application of the 
Daubert reliability factors to nonscientific evidence may impede the 
jurys ability to make a fair and just decision. As applied, Kumho 
seems to work best with nonscientific expert evidence that has scien-
tific underpinnings (e.g., engineering/product design), while it ap-
pears to work least well with nonscientific expert evidence based 
purely on experience. Nonetheless, the trial courts newly assigned 
role as gatekeeper for nonscientific expert testimony means more 
trial review and undoubtedly more exclusionsleaving the jury with 
less information and significantly impacting its responsibility as the 
trier of fact. 
 Accordingly, this Note examines Kumho and the ensuing impact 
of the Kumho/Daubert interplay. Initially, Part II briefly examines 
the evolution of expert testimony admissibility in federal courts, 
prior to Kumho. Next, Part III reviews the Supreme Courts Kumho 
decision itself. Part IV then explores courts reliability analysis, as it 
applies to nonscientific expert testimony, post-Kumho. Specifically, 
this Note assesses three major categories of nonscientific expert tes-
timony: engineering/product design, criminal modus operandi, and 
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handwriting analysis.6 Part V illustrates remaining problems and 
unanswered questions following Kumho. Finally, Part VI suggests an 
alternate methodology for trial courts to employ in considering ad-
missibility of nonscientific expert testimony.  
II.   BACKGROUND OF EXPERT OPINION IN FEDERAL COURTS 
 In the past two decades, the use of expert witnesses has skyrock-
eted.7 Examples of the myriad of experts include police officers,8 ac-
countants,9 bankers,10 lawyers,11 economists,12 landowners,13 mechan-
ics,14 engineers,15 social psychologists,16 experts in drug trafficking,17 
real estate appraisers,18 and even experts in Soviet intelligence re-
cruiting practices.19 Notably, however, an expert witness with spe-
cialized knowledge need not belong to any legitimate discipline.20 
 Frye v. United States21 established the common law standard for 
determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.22 Estab-
lishing what has become known as the general acceptance test, the 
Frye Court held that scientific testimony is inadmissible unless the 
experts methodology is accepted in the general community of scien-
                                                                                                                      
 6. The Author purposely chose three specific areas of nonscientific expert testimony 
that reflect judicial inclination to apply Kumho, and which also illustrate Kumhos applica-
tion in both criminal and civil contexts.  
 7. In a Rand study of California Superior Court trials in the late 1980s, experts ap-
peared in 86% of the trials; and on the average, there were 3.3 experts per trial. See Sam-
uel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1118-19, 1120 n.19. Also, experts 
testify an estimated 40,000 times annually in civil and criminal cases. See id. at 1231 
n.348. 
 8. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 9. See, e.g., Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 10. See, e.g., Den Norske Bank AS v. First Natl Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 56 (1st 
Cir. 1996). 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 12. See, e.g., Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 13. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.1, at 613-14 
(3d ed. 1991). 
 14. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 15. See, e.g., Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1199 (C.D. Ill. 1997). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 18. See, e.g., FDIC v. Suna Assocs., Inc., 80 F.3d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 19. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 20. See, e.g., State v. Briner, 255 N.W.2d 422, 423-24 (Neb. 1977) (retired burglar tes-
tified as an expert on the issue of whether items found in defendants possession were bur-
glar tools); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) (witness who tes-
tified that he had smoked marijuana over one thousand times and had developed the abil-
ity to distinguish marijuana from various sources, permitted to opine that the marijuana 
in question was from Columbia). 
 21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 22. Frye involved a murder trial in which the defendant sought to admit the result of 
a systolic blood pressure deception test (early polygraph test) as exculpatory evidence. See 
id. at 1013. The defense maintained that conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of 
facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under exami-
nation, raises the systolic blood pressure. Id. 
868  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:865 
 
tists.23 In 1975, however, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which include provisions specific to the admissibility of opin-
ion testimony. In particular, Rule 702 reads, If scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.24 
 However, in the seminal case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court held that Rule 702 superseded 
the Frye test and explained that a trial judges gatekeeping respon-
sibility under Rule 702 includes ensuring that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence submitted is not only relevant, but reliable.26 
In the context of the scientific evidence at issue in Daubert, the Court 
set forth a number of specific factors for consideration by district 
courts in determining expert testimony reliability: (i) whether the 
theory or technique can be (and has been) tested;27 (ii) whether the 
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publica-
tion;28 (iii) the theory or techniques known or potential rate or er-
ror;29 (iv) whether standards exist that control the theory or tech-
niques operation;30 and (v) the degree to which the theory or tech-
nique has been accepted in the relevant scientific community.31  
                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. at 1014. Under Frye, judges did not examine the reliability of such testimony, 
but rather they looked to the general community of scientists to see if there was substan-
tial agreement that the methodology the expert employed was sound. See id. Finding that 
the systolic blood pressure deception test was not accepted in the general community of 
scientists, the Frye court did not allow the scientist to testify nor was he allowed to admin-
ister the test to Frye in front of the jury. See id. 
 24. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 25. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 26. Id. at 589 (emphasis added). The Daubert Court found the Frye test rigid and in-
consistent with the liberal thrust and permissive backdrop of the Federal Rules. Id. at 
588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). Note, however, that 
a number of states retained Frye, fearing that Daubert would place ill-suited responsibili-
ties on lay judges. [A] courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the place to con-
duct scientific experiments. If the scientific community considers a procedure [or process] 
unreliable for its own purposes, then the procedure or process must be considered less reli-
able for courtroom use. Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (citing Stokes v. 
State, 548 So. 2d 188, 193-94 (Fla. 1989)). In Florida, for example, an experts opinion 
which is based on a scientific principle, theory or methodology is admissible only when the 
underlying scientific principle, theory or methodology is generally accepted in the field in 
which it belongs. CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 702.3 (1999). 
 27. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (noting the importance of scientific methodology in dis-
tinguishing science from other types of inquiry). 
 28. Id. (noting that submission to the scientific community . . . increases the likeli-
hood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected). 
 29. Id. at 594. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
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 Scientific testimony, however, is only one type of expert testimony 
proffered.32 Under Frye, Dauberts predecessor, most courts took a 
laissez-faire attitude toward the reliability of premises underlying 
nonscientific expert testimony; any doubts about the reliability of the 
experts theory went largely unregarded.33 In a footnote, the 
Daubert Court disclaimed any intention to prescribe admissibility 
standards for nonscientific expert testimony.34 
 The Supreme Court left open significant questions regarding the 
admissibility of nonscientific testimony.35 And, in what became a 
harbinger of the future uncertainty that Daubert created, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist expressed concerns about the Daubert majoritys in-
terpretation of Rule 702 and its application to other types of testi-
mony.36 He questioned whether Daubert would apply to technical or 
other specialized knowledge, and if there was a distinction between 
this type of testimony and the scientific testimony addressed in the 
case.37 Indeed, a conflict ensued among the appellate courts concern-
ing Dauberts applicability to nonscientific evidence. One group of 
courts refused to apply Daubert to nonscientific testimony,38 while 
other courts reached the opposite conclusion.39 
                                                                                                                      
 32. Scientific knowledge is distinguishable from nonscientific evidence by the formers 
susceptibility to validation through hypothesis and testing. Nonscientific evidence, on the 
other hand, draws upon the personal knowledge, training, and skills of the expert. See 1 
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3.4.1, at 32. 
 An art historians opinion that particular painting is a Cézanne, for example, comprises 
technical or other specialized knowledge; she would be applying her knowledge of the Cé-
zanne characteristics that make the paintings unique. See id. On the other hand, an analy-
sis that identifies the painting as a Cézanne based on the time dating of materials used in 
the painting would be based on scientific principles such as aging properties of specific ma-
terials over time. See id. Likewise, a beekeeper who has observed countless bumblebee 
flights would, thanks to his considerable experience, possess specialized knowledge suffi-
cient to enable her to testify that bees always take off into the wind. See Berry v. City of 
Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994) (contrasting beekeepers nonscientific testimony 
regarding bumblebee flight and an aeronautical experts scientific testimony, which would 
be based upon general scientific principles of aerodynamics). 
 33. John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert 
Testimony by Restrictions on Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 361 
(1992). 
 34. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. 
 35. See Jennifer Laser, Note, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application 
of Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. 
L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1997). 
 36. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1997) (Daubert did 
not apply to experts on human-machine interactions); United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 
711, 713-15 (9th Cir. 1997) (police experts testimony not subject to Daubert); United States 
v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) (Daubert only applies to scientific knowl-
edge). 
 39. See United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying Daubert 
analysis to polygraph examination); Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 128 F.3d 
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 Thus, the questions remained: Does the judges gatekeeping role 
apply when the experts conclusions are not based on a scientific the-
ory or methodology but rather simply on skill-based experience and 
training? Does Dauberts strict criteria apply to an expert opinion in-
volving only technical or other specialized knowledge as well as to 
scientific knowledge? What other factors, if any, apply when deter-
mining the admissibility of nonscientific evidence? Accordingly, upon 
granting the petition for certiorari in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
the Supreme Court sought to clarify the Daubert holding and resolve 
conflicting rulings among the circuits.40 
III.   THE KUMHO ISSUE 
 On July 6, 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick 
Carmichael blew out on an interstate highway in Alabama, causing 
an accident that resulted in the death of one of the vans passengers 
and injuries to several others.41 In October 1993 the Carmichaels 
brought a diversity suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Alabama, claiming that the tire, manufactured 
by the defendant, Kumho Tire Company (Kumho Tire), failed as a re-
sult of a defect.42 In support of their claim that the steel-belted radial 
was defective and that the failure did not result from any abuse by 
the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs offered the testimony of Dennis Carlson, 
Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis.43 
 It was undisputed that the blowout occurred when the tires tread 
separated from the remaining tire core. However, Carlsons visual 
observation led him to conclude that this separation was caused by a 
defect in the tire rather than by overdeflection,44 as the defendants 
claimed.45 In particular, Carlson opined that since the tire did not 
                                                                                                                      
656, 659 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Daubert to mechanical engineers testimony); Wat-
kins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert factors relevant to assess-
ing all expert testimony including testimony involving economic valuation, advertising, 
psychology, or engineering); Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 304-05 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (Daubert applicable to proffered testimony of biomechanics expert). 
 40. 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998). 
 41. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. Carlsons qualifications as an expert were not at issue. He had a masters 
degree in mechanical engineering, 10 years of experience with tires while employed by 
Michelin America, Inc. and previously testified as a tire failure consultant in other tort 
cases. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1518 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
Rather, it was the experts methodological application at issue. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 
145. 
 44. Overdeflection results from underinflating the tire or causing it to carry too 
much weight. Id. at 144. 
 45. Id. Note that Carlson also accepted certain background facts about the tires age 
and history: [it] was made in 1988 and had been installed some time before the Carmi-
chaels bought the used minivan in March 1993; the tires tread depth, which was 11/32 of 
an inch when new, . . . had been worn down to depths that ranged from 3/32 of an inch 
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bear at least two of four physical symptoms that he claimed evi-
denced overdeflection, the separation must have been caused by a 
manufacturing defect in the tire.46 
 Kumho Tire moved the district court to exclude Carlsons testi-
mony on the grounds that his methodology failed Rule 702s reliabil-
ity requirement and the reliability factors set forth in Daubert.47 The 
district court agreed with Kumho Tire that it should act as a 
Daubert-type reliability gatekeeper, even though one might con-
sider Carlsons testimony as technical, rather than scientific.48 
Accordingly, the court then examined Carlsons methodology in light 
of the Daubert factors.49 In doing so, the court scrutinized Carlsons 
theorythat the tire must have two of the four elements necessary to 
show overdeflectionfor its testability, whether it has been the 
subject of peer review or publication, the known or potential rate of 
error, and its degree of acceptance . . . within the relevant scientific 
community.50 The court found that all of these factors argued 
against the reliability of Carlsons methods and not only granted 
Kumho Tires motion to exclude the testimony but also its accompa-
nying motion for summary judgment.51 
 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court, holding that, in Daubert, the Supreme Court had ex-
plicitly limited application of the Daubert factors to scientific evi-
dence.52 Finding that Carlsons testimony was based on personal ex-
perience and skill and not scientific principles, the Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
along some parts of the tire, to nothing at all along others; the tire tread had at least two 
punctures which had been inadequately repaired. Id. at 143 (citations omitted). 
 46. See id. at 143-44. These overdeflection factors were: tread wear on the tires 
shoulder that is greater than the tread wear along the tires center . . . ; signs of a bead 
groove; sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of deterioration such as discoloration . . . ; 
[and] marks on the tires rim flange. Id. at 144. Carlson conceded that the tire in question 
showed some symptoms of each of these overdeflection factors, including inadequately 
filled puncture holes, which can also cause tread separation. See id. at 144. But in each 
instance, he testified that the symptoms were not significant, and he explained why he be-
lieved that they did not reveal overdeflection. Id. at 145. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. (quoting Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1520 (S.D. 
Ala. 1996)) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 
(1993)). 
 51. See Carmichael, 923 F. Supp. at 1519-24. Granting the plaintiffs motion for recon-
sideration, the district court agreed that Daubert should be applied flexibly (i.e., Dauberts 
four factors were simply illustrative and that other factors could argue in favor of admissi-
bility.) However, the district courts bottom line analysis was that Carlsons methodology 
used in analyzing the data obtained in his visual inspection lacked sufficient indicia of re-
liability, justifying the exclusion of his testimony. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 
No. 93-0860-CB-S, Order at 4-5 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
 52. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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Court of Appeals found that the district court had erred by applying 
Daubert to the tire experts testimony.53 
A.   The Supreme Courts Kumho Opinion 
 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Elev-
enth Circuit and held that the gatekeeping obligation of trial judges, 
under Daubert, extends to all expert testimony, not merely testimony 
that is scientific, and that the Daubert factors for assessing reliabil-
ity may apply to nonscientific as well as scientific reliability.54 
1.   Gatekeeping Objective Applies to All Expert Testimony 
 In holding the judicial gatekeeping function applicable to all ex-
pert testimony, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for the majority,55 
said that Rule 702 makes no relevant distinction between scientific 
knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge.56 Hence, 
the Rule applies its reliability standard to all knowledge that is the 
subject of expert testimonywhether scientific, technical, or special-
ized.57 Nor is the evidentiary rationale underlying Dauberts gate-
keeping obligation limited to scientific knowledge; [t]he Rules [702 
and 703] grant [testimonial] latitude to all experts, not just to scien-
tific ones.58 
 Finally, and practically speaking, the Court noted the difficulty 
judges might have in distinguishing between scientific knowledge 
and technical or other specialized knowledge . . . and recognized 
that there is no clear line that divides the one from the others.59 
                                                                                                                      
 53. See id. at 1436. The court based its conclusion upon the manner in which the ex-
pert reached his opinion: 
[I]t seems apparent to us that [the experts] testimony is non-scientific. Al-
though [the defendant] is no doubt correct that the laws of physics and chemis-
try are implicated . . . [the expert] makes no pretense of basing his opinion on 
any scientific theory of physics or chemistry. Instead, [the expert] claims that 
he can identify telltale markings revealing whether a tire failed because of a 
defect . . . [the expert] asserts no knowledge of the physics or chemistry that 
might explain why the . . . tire failed. Thus, we conclude that [his] testimony 
falls outside the scope of Daubert and that the district court erred as a matter 
of law by applying Daubert in this case. 
Id. 
 54. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. 
 55. Justice Breyer was by joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices OConnor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. 
 56. See id. at 147. 
 57. See id. Justice Breyer suggested that while the Daubert Court only discussed the 
reliability standards applicable to scientific knowledge, that was simply because scientific 
knowledge was what was at issue in that case. See id. 
 58. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 
(1993)) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. at 148 (recognizing that disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific 
knowledge). 
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Moreover, even if the distinctions were easily made, the Court found 
no convincing need to make them.60  
2.   Dauberts Reliability Factors Not Limited to Scientific 
Testimony 
 In summing up the trial judges gatekeeping obligation, the 
Court said Daubert requires the trial judge to ensure the reliability 
of all expert testimony.61 Recognizing that there are many different 
kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise, the Court 
emphasized the importance of examining the particular circum-
stances of each case to determine whether the factors are reasonable 
measures of reliability.62 Daubert made clear that its list of factors 
was meant to be helpful, not definitive.63 Even so, the Court said 
that some of Dauberts questions can help to evaluate the reliability 
even of experienced-based [or nonscientific] testimony.64 
 In sum, Rule 702 doesnt specifically limit certain kinds of ques-
tions to certain kinds of experts: 
Life and the legal cases that it generates are too complex to war-
rant so definitive a match . . . [T]he trial judge must have consid-
erable leeway in deciding . . . how to go about determining whether 
a particular expert testimony is reliable . . . [and] should consider 
the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable 
measures of the reliability of [the] expert testimony.65 
                                                                                                                      
 60. The Court stated: 
Experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of . . . gen-
eral truths derived from . . . specialized experience . . . [and] the experts tes-
timony often will rest upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the 
jurys] own. The trial judges effort to assure that the specialized testimony is 
reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate that foreign experience, 
whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge. 
Id. at 148-49 (citing Hand, Historian and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Tes-
timony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)). 
 61. See id. at 149 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). Dauberts general principles ap-
ply to matters described in Rule 702. . . . [a]nd where such testimonys factual basis, data, 
principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question . . . the trial 
judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and 
experience of [the relevant] discipline. Id. (citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 150. 
 63. Id. (citing examples of where Daubert factors dont workeven in scientific con-
texts). 
 64. Id. at 151. (citing two examples: the first where it might be appropriate for a trial 
judge to ask how often an engineering experts experience-based methodology has pro-
duced erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant 
engineering community; the second where at times [it may] be useful to ask even of a 
witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distin-
guish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the 
field would recognize as acceptable). 
 65. Id. at 151-52. 
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Therefore, Dauberts list of specific factors neither necessarily nor ex-
clusively applies to all experts or in every case.66 
3.   The Courts Broad Latitude in Deciding How to Test 
Expert Reliability 
 A trial courts decision about how to determine an experts reli-
ability will be afforded the same deference as the trial courts ulti-
mate conclusion regarding reliability (i.e., it will be reviewed only 
for an abuse of discretion).67 [W]hether Dauberts specific factors are, 
or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a 
matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to deter-
mine.68 
 Finally, the Court cited efficiency as the principal reason for hold-
ing that a trial courts decision regarding whether or when a special 
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability 
(Daubert hearings) will also be reviewed for abuse of discretion.69 Ap-
parently, a trial court need not undertake detailed and expensive 
proceedings addressing Daubert-type objections for those experts us-
ing methodologies generally recognized as reliable.70 
4.   Application to the Tire Failure Expert 
 Even though the specific question of whether the trial judge in 
Kumho abused his discretion when he excluded the tire experts tes-
timony was not raised by the certiorari petition, the Court went on to 
explain the way in which a trial judge may consider Dauberts fac-
                                                                                                                      
 66. It should be noted that the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
has proposed an amendment to Federal Rule 702. See Advisory Committees Note on Pro-
posed Fed. R. Evid. 702, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed. R. Civ. 
Pro. and Evid.: Request for Comment 122 (August 1998). Under the proposal, Dauberts 
gatekeeping function applies to all expert testimony, nonscientific as well as scientific, and 
an experts testimony would be admissible only if 1) the testimony is sufficiently based 
upon reliable facts or data, 2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and meth-
ods, and 3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case. Id. 
 67. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152-53 (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
143 (1997) (holding that the standard for appellate review of Daubert decisions admitting 
or excluding expert opinion is abuse of discretion)). 
 68. Id. at 153. 
 69. See id. at 152-53. 
 70. The Kumho Court stated:  
Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed both 
to avoid unnecessary reliability proceedings in ordinary cases where the reli-
ability of an experts methods is properly taken for granted, and to require ap-
propriate proceedings in the unusual or more complex cases where cause for 
questioning the experts reliability arises. 
Id. at 152. 
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tors by applying . . . [its holding] to the case at hand.71 The Court 
concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in ex-
cluding Carlsons expert testimony.72 The relevant issue, the Court 
said, was whether [Carlson] could reliably determine the cause of 
this tires separation and not the reasonableness in general of 
[Carlsons] use of a visual and tactile inspection to determine [if] 
overdeflection had caused the tires tread to separate from [the] . . . 
carcass.73 
 Indeed, the reliability of Carlsons conclusion that the tire was de-
fective was called into doubt by his admissions: 
The tire in question . . . had traveled far enough so that some of 
the tread had been worn bald; it should have been taken out of 
service; it had been repaired (inadequately) for punctures; and it 
bore some of the very marks that [Carlson] said indicated not a de-
fect, but abuse through overdeflection.74  
The Courts recognition of the condition of the tire underscores the 
particularized nature of the Courts analysis with respect to the reli-
ability of Carlsons proffered testimony. 
 Moreover, Carlsons theorythat absence of at least two of four 
specific signs of abuse of deflection indicates a defective tirewas 
called into doubt by his assertion that the tire before him had not 
been abused, despite some evidence of the presence of the very signs 
for which he looked (and two punctures).75 In applying the factors 
from Daubert, the Court noted that there was no indication in the re-
cord that other experts in the industry used the same test as Carl-
son, and that there were no references in the record to any articles or 
papers that validated the experts approach.76 In sum, because the 
district court ultimately based its decision upon Carlsons failure to 
                                                                                                                      
 71. Id. at 152. Justice Stevens dissented to this, however, saying, it is neither fair to 
litigants nor good practice for this Court to reach out to decide questions not raised by the 
certiorari petition. Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 72. See id. at 153. 
 73. Id. at 154. The trial court ha[s] to decide whether this particular expert had suffi-
cient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues in the 
case. Id. at 156-57 (citing 4 WEINSTEINS FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 702.05[1], at 702-33 (Jo-
seph M. McLaughlin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998)); see also Advisory Committees Notes on FED. 
R. EVID. 702, supra note 66 (stressing that district courts must scrutinize whether the 
principles and methods employed by an expert have been properly applied to the facts of 
the case.). 
 74. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 154. 
 75. Id. Carlsons deposition transcripts also cast doubt upon his reliability when he 
could not tell with any certainty from the tread wear whether a tire had traveled less 
than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles. Id. Yet, the Court derisively commented, he sought 
that the district court find reliable his method of visual and tactile inspection sufficiently 
precise to ascertain with some certainty the abuse-related significance of minute shoul-
der/center relative tread wear differences. Id. at 155. 
 76. See id. at 157. 
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satisfy either Dauberts factors or any other set of reasonable reliabil-
ity criteria, it did not abuse its discretion.77 
IV.   POST-KUMHO APPLICATION 
 In examining cases concerning the admissibility of nonscientific 
expert evidence after Kumho, several major observations come to 
mind: 1) there is no consistent methodology as to when, where, and 
how to employ the Daubert factors to nonscientific testimony; 2) 
courts have been loathe to develop other applicable reliability factors 
(besides the highly suspect have-courts-admitted-this-type-of-expert-
testimony-before factor); 3) such inconsistencies have resulted in in-
consistent outcomes regarding admissibility of similar nonscientific 
expert testimony; 4) appellate courts have shown almost total defer-
ence to the trial courts because of the abuse-of-discretion standard 
frequently bolstered by harmless error analysis, if necessary;78 and 5) 
Kumho seems to work best with nonscientific expert evidence with 
scientific underpinnings, such as engineering/product design, while it 
appears to work least well with nonscientific, experience-based ex-
pert evidence. Accordingly, this Part examines Kumhos effect on the 
admissibility of three significant areas of nonscientific expert testi-
mony: engineering/product design, criminal modus operandi and 
handwriting analysis. 
A.   Engineering/Product Design 
 In Jaurequi v. Carter Manufacturing Co.,79 the Eighth Circuit 
held that the district court properly excluded the proffered expert 
testimony of a mechanical engineer and a human factors engineer, 
both of whom would have testified that the design and product safety 
warnings for a corn-harvesting device were defective.80 In recognizing 
Kumho, the court said, when engineers are brought in to suggest 
that a product should have been designed differently, the district 
court does not err in looking to Daubert for guidance as to whether 
such testimony should be admitted or excluded.81 
                                                                                                                      
 77. Id. at 158. In a short but ominous concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, with whom 
Justice OConnor and Justice Thomas joined, cautioned against any lessened vigilance by 
the trial courts in their gatekeeping obligation to exclude expertise that is fausse and 
science that is junky. Id. at 159. That is, the courts discretion is not discretion to per-
form the [gatekeeping] function inadequately, and failure to apply one or another of [the 
Daubert factors] may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion. Id. at 158-59. 
 78. See infra Part V.B. Indeed, this deferential treatment by the appellate courts pro-
vides, in many cases, little real insight into the actual application of the Kumho principles. 
 79. 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 80. The plaintiff brought this action against John Deere Company, alleging that de-
sign and warning defects associated with a Deere corn head proximately caused an acci-
dent in which the plaintiffs legs were amputated. See id. 
 81. Id. at 1083. 
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 Though it is not clear from this opinion to what extent the district 
court applied the Daubert factors, the Eighth Circuit applied at least 
two of the Daubert factors in affirming the exclusion of the mechani-
cal engineers testimony that the corn-harvesting device was unrea-
sonably dangerous because it lacked awareness barriers.82 First, 
the court addressed Dauberts testing prong: [The expert] has not 
attempted to construct or even draw the suggested device, much less 
test its utility as a safety device or its compatibility with the corn 
heads proper function.83 Second, the court addressed Dauberts 
general acceptance prong: Nor has [the expert] pointed to any 
manufacturer that incorporates awareness barriers into corn heads 
or similar farming machinery.84 The court followed that same analy-
sis regarding the testimony concerning the sufficiency of safety warn-
ings on the corn heads, noting that neither engineering expert had 
created or even designed a warning device which would have been 
more appropriate, much less tested its effectiveness . . . . [and neither 
expert] pointed in their deposition testimony to other manufacturers 
of farm machinery who were employing [the proffered] warnings.85 
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the engi-
neers expert testimony.86 
 In Kinser v. Gehl Co.,87 the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court 
should have excluded the testimony of two engineers who testified 
that the design of a hay baler was defective.88 In so holding, the court 
acknowledged the application of Kumho to nonscientific testimony 
and the flexible and non-exclusive use of the Daubert factors in 
evaluating the reliability of that testimony.89 
 In this case, the Tenth Circuit appeared to focus exclusively on 
Dauberts testing prong in its analysis:90 [T]esting of alternative 
design proposals is often a critical component to the reliability of an 
engineer expert witness testimony on this subject.91 The court noted 
that most of the proposed design modifications discussed by the ex-
pertsfor example, that the manufacturer failed to post safety warn-
ings, that the design lacked automatic shut-off capability and a 
safety guardfailed to provide an adequate foundation of reliabil-
                                                                                                                      
 82. Id. at 1084. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 1085. 
 87. 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999). Kinser was a product liabilities actition brought by 
a farmers wife against a baler manufacturer when her husband was fatally injured while 
baling alfalfa with the defendants big round baler. See id. at 1264.  
 88. See id. at 1271-72. The court concluded, however, that any error was ultimately 
harmless, and declined to reverse the district court. See id. at 1271. 
 89. Id. at 1271. 
 90. Id. at 1271-72. 
 91. Id. at 1272. 
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ity.92 Simply throwing out a concept and suggesting it may be feasi-
ble is an insufficient basis for relaxing the usual first-hand knowl-
edge requirement of the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . .93 The Kinser 
court noted that the experts acknowledged that their recommended 
changes for the baler were all mere concepts; [they] neither devel-
oped designs nor tested the feasibility or safety of any of [their] pro-
posals.94 
 In Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,95 the Sixth 
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by de-
ciding to exclude the testimony of an expert on the door closing sys-
tem of a passenger van.96 The court recognized Kumhos applicabil-
ity to nonscientific testimony and noted that when an expert posits 
an experience-based methodology, some of the Daubert factors can 
help to evaluate the reliability of proffered testimony.97 In Moisenko, 
however, because the plaintiff failed to establish any of the factors 
set out in Daubert, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district courts de-
cision that the door latch experts testimony was unreliable and, 
thus, inadmissible under Rule 702.98 
 Finally, in Ballard v. Buckley Powder Co.,99 a homeowner prof-
fered the expert testimony of an architectural engineer, who de-
signed foundations to withstand seismic activity, to support her 
claim that the defendant caused damage to her home while conduct-
ing blasting operations during construction of a nearby highway. In-
deed, the court recognized the application of Kumho when determin-
ing the reliability of the engineers testimony. In this case, however, 
the court applied all of the Daubert factors in deciding to exclude the 
engineers testimony and found that [n]othing [was] cited to show 
that [the experts] method or basis for determining causation ha[d] 
been tested or subjected to peer review, ha[d] a known or potential 
rate of error, or ha[d] attained general acceptance in the field of en-
gineering.100 
                                                                                                                      
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (citing Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 94. See id. at 1271. Interestingly, the court recognized that this type of testimony (i.e., 
[t]o propose a design concept or design change without engaging in [a well-recognized 
product design] methodology contravenes the engineering code of ethics.) Id. 
 95. 198 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). The unreported opinion 
is available in Westlaw. Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, No. 98-2202, 
1999 WL 1045075 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1999). 
 96. See Moisenko, 1999 WL 1045075, at *1. The plaintiff brought this action against 
the vans manufacturer alleging that the rear door latch of the van malfunctioned during 
an accident, resulting in his wifes death. Id. 
 97. See id. at *2 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)). 
 98. See id. at *3. 
 99. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 100. Id. at 1184. 
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 So, although it appears that there is no consistent application of 
the Daubert factors in assessing the reliability of an engineers expert 
testimony, courts do seem to be consistently using Daubert as a start-
ing point at least. Moreover, application of Daubert testing prong 
appears most prevalent in cases involving engineers testimony. Ac-
cordingly, the Kumho/Daubert combination seems to be a good fit for 
evaluating the reliability of engineers testimony in the product li-
ability context, most likely because of the scientific underpinnings of 
engineering knowledge itself. 
B.   Criminal Modus Operandi 
 A number of opinions citing Kumho involve nonscientific expert 
testimony concerning the modus operandi of various types of crimi-
nals. In United States v. Molina,101 the District Court for the District 
of Minnesota permitted the expert testimony of a Minneapolis police 
captain concerning drug trafficking trade such as drug distribution 
amounts, the use of guns, the use of aliases, and the use of surveil-
lance partners.102 The defendant contended that the admission of 
such evidence was improper use of expert testimony.103 In finding no 
abuse of discretion in the decision to permit the drug trafficking 
trade experts testimony, however, the Eighth Circuit appeared un-
daunted by the trial courts apparent failure to conduct any specific 
reliability analysis as required by Daubert/Kumho.104 Rather, the 
Eighth Circuit merely cited a previous case that had given the dis-
trict court discretion to allow law enforcement officials to testify as 
experts concerning the modus operandi of drug dealers . . . as justifi-
cation for its finding.105 
 In addition, the court seemed to confuse a helpfulness analysis 
pursuant to Rule 702 with the reliability analysis prescribed by Dau-
bert/Kumho.106 In this regard, the court merely recognized that the 
drug trafficking experts testimony provide[d] a context for the jury 
and undermined the defendants innocent companion theory.107 Al-
                                                                                                                      
 101. 172 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Corona v. United States, 120 
S. Ct. 221 (1999). 
 102. Id. at 1056. 
 103. See id. The defendant asserted an innocent bystander defense to the conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine charge made against her in connection with an arrest of her boyfriend 
for distributing cocaine. The prosecutor, however, offered the testimony of Minneapolis Po-
lice Captain Rocky Fontana who provided detailed testimony as to how drug dealers rou-
tinely conduct their drug transactions with a party. Fontana explained that one person 
typically sells the drugs while the other person serves as a surveillance monitor. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 110 F.3d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1997)). The Author 
refers to this type of justification as the weve-generally-done-it-before reliability analy-
sisnot quite the particularized reliability determination as called for by the Kumho 
Court. 
 106. See id. 
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ory.107 Although the court cited Kumho for the proposition that 
Daubert applies to all expert testimony,108 no Daubert factors were 
employed. Indeed, the courts analysis was void of any other reason-
able reliability criteria as urged by Kumho. 
 In United States v. Romero,109 the Seventh Circuit found no abuse 
of discretion when the district court admitted, over the defendants 
objection, the prosecutions FBI experts testimony concerning the 
general traits of child molesters.110 Here, the court cited the flexible 
reliability test and the broad latitude the district court enjoys when 
determining the reliability of nonscientific evidence.111 
 Again, however, the court merely cited past cases where the court 
had recognized the value of expert testimony in explaining a compli-
cated criminal methodology as rationale for admissibility.112 The 
court also agreed with the trial courts decision to admit the testi-
mony because [the experts] testimony was helpful to the jury in un-
derstanding how child molesters operatesomething with which 
most jurors would have little experience.113 There was no apparent 
reliability determination employing the Daubert factors, or any oth-
ers, by either the trial court or the Seventh Circuit, involving the 
particular circumstances of this case. The court only offered the 
newly evolving weve-generally-done-it-before factor to justify find-
ing abuse of discretion. 
 In United States v. Harris,114 the defendant appealed his convic-
tion and sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 
At trial, the prosecution sought to offer a police officers testimony 
as to the methods of packaging and distributing crack cocaine and 
other methods and operations of street level drug dealers.115 Over 
the defendants objection that the district court did not properly de-
termine the reliability of the officers expert opinion testimony, the 
officer was permitted to testify.116 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit cited 
Kumho and the broadening of the Daubert analysis to specifically 
include technical as well as other specialized knowledge, such as 
                                                                                                                      
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 1056. 
 109. 189 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1286 (2000). 
 110. Id. at 582-86. 
 111. Id. at 584 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 585. 
 114. 192 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 115. Id. at 583. The officers testimony included the supposition that a rolled up pant 
leg often serves as a signal that a person has drugs for sale, that shoes and socks are com-
mon places to hide drugs, and that large pieces of crack are often broken into smaller 
pieces and wrapped individually for sale. Id. The defendant argued that the amount of co-
caine found on his person (approximately 5.9 grams) was for his own personal consump-
tionand not for distribution. See id. at 589. 
 116. Id. at 583. 
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that possessed by [the testifying officer].117 The court, however, 
merely cited to a previous case, which stated that a police officer[s] 
expert testimony [is] admissible where it will aid the jurys under-
standing of an area.118 Again, although the court cited both Daubert 
and Kumho, there was no apparent reliability determination using 
Daubert factors or any others pertaining to the circumstances of this 
particular case. 
 In United States v. Matthews,119 a defendant convicted of carjack-
ing argued that the district court violated Daubert/Kumho by allow-
ing a gang expert to testify at his sentencing.120 Specifically, the de-
fendant argued that the officers methodology was unreliable, not 
subject to peer review, and not generally accepted within the scien-
tific community as Daubert requires.121 Although the Fifth Circuit 
recognized that district courts gatekeeping responsibility applied to 
the officers nonscientific testimony, the court missed a perfect oppor-
tunity to pass on the applicability of the Daubert factors to nonscien-
tific testimony by invoking not only the Joiner abuse-of-discretion 
standard, but also a harmless error analysis.122 
 In United States v. Hankey,123 the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to apply any 
Daubert factors and admitting testimony of a gang expert concerning 
gangs code of silence.124 The prosecution had introduced the testi-
mony of an FBI anti-gang task force member that gangs enforce a 
code of silence among their members [and] that any affiliated gang 
member would be subject to violent retribution if one gang member 
testified against another.125 Accordingly, the defendant appealed his 
conviction on grounds that the district court failed to properly dis-
charge its gatekeeping function and abused its discretion in admit-
ting the gang experts testimony.126 
                                                                                                                      
 117. Id. at 589 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)). 
 118. Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 119. 178 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 359 (1999). 
 120. See id. at 303. An officer of the San Antonio Police Departments gang investiga-
tion unit testified at [the defendants] sentencing hearing concerning the Crip gangs in-
fluence, gang leadership, gang terminology and tattoos, and a gang database kept by the 
department. Id. He identified the defendant as a gang member and testified [that the de-
fendant] was documented as a gang member in the database about six times. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 304 (citing Unites States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
Accordingly, the court held: We need not determine the effects of Daubert on non-scientific 
testimony at sentencing in light of . . . Kumho Tire Co. . . . because the remaining non-
expert evidence of Matthews gang-related activities at sentencing is sufficient to support 
. . . enhancement. Id. 
 123. 203 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2733 (2000). 
 124. See id. at 1167. 
 125. See id. at 1165. The prosecution offered this testimony to rebut the co-defendants 
testimony that the defendant was not involved in the PCP transactions. 
 126. See id. at 1166. 
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 In rejecting the defendants argument, the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized Kumho, emphasizing that judges are entitled to broad discre-
tion when discharging their gatekeeping function.127 Here, however, 
the court specifically noted that the Daubert factors were inapplica-
ble to nonscientific testimony, as the experts testimony was simply 
based on his communication with gang members and officers.128 Not-
withstanding Dauberts inapplicability, the Ninth Circuit lauded the 
district courts diligent gatekeeping role and its extensive voir dire 
of the expert prior to admitting the experts testimony.129 
 The U.S. Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, however, applied 
two Daubert factors in determining the reliability of an exhibition-
ism expert witness.130 Citing Daubert and Kumho, the court also ac-
knowledged the general frustration that trial courts seem to be hav-
ing: 
Neither the Supreme Court nor our superior court assigned a 
value to any of the Daubert factors, which the military judge must 
weigh and balance when performing the gatekeeper function of the 
admissibility . . . of expert opinion evidence. This factor notwith-
standing, we believe a critical reading of Daubert and its progeny 
reflects that the existence or ability of peer review of and the 
availability to duplicate the science or methodology in question in 
order to ascertain an error rate is critical to a determination of 
admissibility.131 
 In this case, the expert candidly admitted there was no underly-
ing reliable support for the proffered evidence.132 In its opinion, how-
ever, the court seemed to reject the experts testimony more on the 
basis that it was not generally accepted.133 Accordingly, the court 
found that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting 
the testimony defendants expert witness testimony.134 
 Unlike the arguably consistent use of the Daubert factors in as-
sessing the reliability of engineers testimony in a product design 
context, assessment of the reliability of criminal modus operandi ex-
                                                                                                                      
 127. See id. at 1167. 
 128. See id. at 1169. 
 129. See id. at 1168-69. In particular, the court noted the number of years the expert 
had been employed as a police officer, the number of years the expert had been working 
undercover with gang members, the amount of formal training received in gang structure 
and organization, and the fact that the expert taught classes about gangs, all as factors 
contributing to the gang experts reliability. See id. 
 130. See United States v. Huberty, 50 M.J. 704, 710-11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999), 
affd, 53 M.J. 369 (C.A.A.F. 2000). The expert relied on results of the Minnesota Multipha-
sic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) to determine that it was unlikely [the defendant was] 
an exhibitionist. Id. at 709. 
 131. Id. at 710. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 590-93 (1993)) (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. The expert was unable to cite any specific cases or studies where the MMPI-2 
was used to conclude that one is not an exhibitionist. See id. 
 134. Id. at 711. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999)). 
2000]                    KUMHO TIRE CO. V. CARMICHAEL 883 
 
perts is almost totally void of reliability analysis employing any of 
the Daubert factors. In these types of cases, the trial courts appear to 
employ precedent, or past admissions of similar testimony, as the key 
reliability factor. This, however, contravenes the Kumho requirement 
of a particularized reliability determination, one based on the facts of 
the particular case. Moreover, the significant deference afforded the 
trial court by Kumho as to how the court conducts its reliability de-
termination (often coupled with harmless error analysis), virtually 
insulates the trial judges reliability determination from reversal. 
C.   Handwriting Analysis 
 At least two circuit courts have dealt with the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony regarding handwriting analysis following Kumho.135 
In United States v. Paul,136 the Eleventh Circuit considered the ad-
missibility of testimony from both an FBI document examiner and a 
law professor concerning a demand note written by an alleged extor-
tionist.137 The FBI document examiner compared the handwriting on 
the note and the envelope to the defendants handwriting samples 
and concluded that the defendant was the author of both.138 After 
conviction, the defendant argued that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting FBI handwriting analysis experts testimony 
because his handwriting analysis failed to meet the reliability re-
quirements of Daubert.139 In recognizing Kumho, the court noted 
that Dauberts gatekeeping obligation . . . applies . . . to all expert 
                                                                                                                      
 135. Just as this Part analyzes admissibility of handwriting identification evidence in 
the post-Kumho period, at least one author addressed the same subject in the post-Daubert 
context. See Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert 
World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997). 
 136. 175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 535 (1999). 
 137. The extortion note directed a bank branch manager to deliver $100,000 to the 
mens restroom of a downtown Atlanta McDonalds restaurant. See id. at 908. 
 138. See id. at 909. The court described the examiners enquiry: 
Specifically, [the FBI document examiner] asked [the defendant] to write the 
word restaurant. In the presence of a FBI agent, [the defendant] misspelled the 
word as follows: resturant. In the extortion note the extortionist misspelled 
the word restaurant the same way. [The FBI examiner] also asked [the defen-
dant] to write out Spearman [the bank managers name]. [The defendant] 
spelled it Sperman, the same way the extortionist had addressed the envelope. 
Id. 
 139. Id. The opinion states: 
[The defendant] ha[d] not challenged . . . [the FBI experts] qualifications as an 
expert on handwriting analysis. . . .[A]t the time of the trial, [the FBI expert]: 
(1) was a full-time handwriting examiner for 30 years; (2) was a member of four 
professional handwriting analysis organizations; (3) established both the Secret 
Services and the Naval Investigative Services questioned document labora-
tories; (4) lectured and taught extensively in the field of handwriting analysis; 
and (5) trained new questioned document examiners for several law enforce-
ment organizations. 
Id. 
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testimony. . . . [T]he test of reliability is a flexible one, and Dauberts 
list of specific factors neither necessarily nor solely applies to all ex-
perts in every case.140 
 It is not clear from the opinion, however, what kind of reliability 
analysisif anythe district court engaged in prior to denying the 
defendants motion to exclude the handwriting experts testimony. 
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit refuted the defendants primary 
argumentthat handwriting analysis is not reliable evidenceby 
stating in a footnote, Courts have long received handwriting analy-
sis testimony as admissible evidence.141 Missing, however, is any re-
quirement to apply any Daubert factors (or any others) when consid-
ering the admissibility of handwriting analysis expert testimony. 
Moreover, the court seemed to give short shrift to Kumhos require-
ment for a particularized reliability determinationseeming to 
base reliability of this handwriting experts testimony solely on the 
basis that it has been admitted in the past. 
 In perhaps the more useful part of the opinion, the court ex-
plained why the district court did not abuse its discretion in exclud-
ing the defendants rebuttal handwriting analysis expert.142 The court 
implicitly identified several factors that a court might consider in ex-
amining the reliability of a handwriting expert: 1) the currency of 
research or writing done on the subject of handwriting analysis;143 2) 
the amount of formal training;144 3) the amount of relevant work ex-
perience;145 and 4) the experts membership in related professional 
organizations.146 In excluding the defendants proffered expert, the 
court said, His skill, experience, training and education as a lawyer 
did not make him any more qualified to testify as an expert on 
handwriting analysis than a lay person who read the same arti-
cles.147 
                                                                                                                      
 140. Id. at 910 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)). 
 141. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 1997) (admit-
ting a handwriting experts testimony to show that signatures on numerous documents 
were defendants); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 848-50 (3d Cir. 1995) (admit-
ting handwriting expert witness testimony)). 
 142. See Paul, 175 F.3d at 912. The defendants expert was an evidence professor who 
coauthored a law review article critical of forensic document examiners ability to reach 
the correct conclusion in questioned document examinations. Id. 
 143. The law professor had done virtually no further research or writing on the sub-
ject of the reliability of handwriting expertise since the University of Pennsylvania pub-
lished his law review article [seven years earlier]. Id. 
 144. The law professor had received no formal training in the field [and] had never at-
tended seminars on handwriting analysis. Id. 
 145. The law professor had never worked in a questioned documents laboratory. Id. 
 146. The law professor was not a member of any professional organizations in the 
field. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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 In United States v. Battle,148 a defendant convicted of conspiring to 
distribute crack cocaine argued on appeal that the district court 
erred in admitting the testimony of an expert document examiner.149 
The expert compared a signature appearing on a money transfer 
with examples of the defendants signature, and then testified, in ef-
fect, that, in his opinion, [the defendant] had offered the signature 
. . . on the Western Union Transfer.150 The Tenth Circuit recognized 
that in Kumho the Supreme Court held that Daubert applied not 
only to scientific testimony, but to all expert testimony.151 But in 
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting the experts testimony,152 the Tenth Circuit provided little guid-
ance in applying the Daubert factors to handwriting analysis: Our 
study of the record on appeal convinces us that [the experts] prof-
fered testimony met the reliability and relevancy test of Daubert.153 
Moreover, the court gave further support to the trial courts broad 
latitude to exclude expert testimony, by saying that any error . . . [in 
the admission of the experts testimony] is harmless error.154  
 Judge Gertners United States v. Hines opinion remains by far the 
most enlightening post-Kumho opinion regarding the admissibility of 
handwriting analysis experts.155 In Hines, the defendant was charged 
for allegedly robbing a bank in Chelsea, Massachusetts, and the gov-
ernments principle evidence consisted of the handwriting analysis of 
the robbery note.156 In particular, the government offered the testi-
mony of an FBI document examiner to testify as to the authorship of 
a stick-up note found at the scene of the crime.157 The defendant 
sought to exclude the testimony because it failed to meet the 
Daubert/Kumho standards.158 In the alternative, had the court al-
lowed the FBI document examiners testimony, the defendant sought 
                                                                                                                      
 148. 188 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 
602 (1999). The unreported opinion is available in Westlaw. United States v. Battle, No. 
98-3246, 1999 WL 596966 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 1999). 
 149. See Battle, 1999 WL 596966, at **1. The document examiner was employed by the 
Kansas Bureau of Investigation for 23 years, including 12 years as a document examiner. 
See id. at **3. 
 150. Id. at **3. The name on the money transfer was different (Anthony Jenkins) from 
the defendants name (Shawn Battle). See id. 
 151. Id. at **4 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63 (D. Mass. 1999). Judge Gertner drafted this opinion after 
the first trial in this matter resulted in a hung jury. See id. 
 156. See id. at 63. In addition, the governments evidence consisted of the eyewitness 
identification of the teller who was robbed. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
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to have his own expert testify as to the weaknesses of the FBI ex-
perts methodology and the basis of the experts conclusions.159 
 The district court, however, denied the defendants motion to ex-
clude the handwriting experts entire testimony but did not permit 
the handwriting expert to make any ultimate conclusions on the ac-
tual authorship of the questioned writing.160 The court first identified 
handwriting analysis as an old field, . . . which has been the subject 
of expert testimony for countless years.161 Calling handwriting 
analysis the prototype of a technical field regularly admitted into 
evidence, Judge Gertner commented that if he were to give special 
emphasis to general acceptance or treat Daubert/Kumho as calling 
for a rigorous analysis of only new technical fields, not traditional 
ones, then handwriting analysis would largely pass muster.162 
 But, Judge Gertner continued, if I were to apply the Dau-
bert/Kumho standards rigorously, looking for such things as 
empirical testing, rate of error, etc., the testimony would have seri-
ous problems:163 
[Handwriting analysis] has never been subject to meaningful reli-
ability or validity testing, comparing the results of the handwrit-
ing examiners conclusions with actual outcomes.164 There is no 
peer review by a competitive, unbiased community of practitio-
ners and academics.165 To the extent that it has been generally 
accepted, it is not by a financially disinterested independent 
community, like an academic community, only other handwriting 
analysts have weighed in. It has never been shown to be more reli-
able than the results obtained by lay people.166 
 Judge Gertner differentiated the two parts of the experts prof-
fered testimony.167 Part 1 was the FBI documents examiners expert 
                                                                                                                      
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at 63-64. As a result of this ruling, counsel for [the defendant] made the 
strategic decision not to call [its expert, the evidence professor] to critique handwriting 
analysis at trial. Id. at 64. 
 161. Id. at 63. 
 162. Id. at 68 (citing D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for 
Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Expertise, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 764-
71 (1989) (stating the validity of handwriting analysis has been assumed in Dean Wig-
mores treatises, and virtually every standard evidence treatise since that point)). 
 163. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (citing United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 
1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that if the court had to apply Daubert to handwriting 
testimony, it would have been excluded)). 
 164. Id. (citing Risinger et al., supra note 160, at 736). Indeed, Judge Gertner here re-
lies heavily on Mark P. Denbeaux (the ubiquitous evidence professor and co-author, along 
with Risinger and Saks, supra note 160), recognizing that Denbeauxs testimony was cited 
in United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 852 (3d Cir. 1995). See Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 
68 n.15. 
 165. Id. at 68 (quoting Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1038)). 
 166. Id. (citation omitted). 
 167. See id. at 67. 
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testimony with respect to the similarities between the defendants 
known handwriting and the handwriting observed in the robbery 
note.168 Part 2 was the experts conclusive testimony that the defen-
dant did, in fact, author the robbery note.169 
 Regarding Part 1, Judge Gertner recognized that since the jury 
could understand and evaluate the FBI experts account of what was 
similar or dissimilar in the defendants handwriting and the hand-
writing in the robbery note, and because the witness could be cross-
examined about the consequences of the differences, the jur[ors] 
[could] draw their own conclusions.170 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the FBI expert could testify to the ways in which she . . . 
found [the defendants] known handwriting similar to or dissimilar 
from the handwriting of the robbery note.171 
 But with regard to Part 2, the court was not so flexible in its ap-
plication of the Daubert factors, and seemed to establish a higher 
standard when the expert is testifying as to a conclusive issue.172 
Specifically, the court says: 
There is no data that suggests that handwriting analysts can say, 
like DNA experts, that this person is the author of the document. 
There are no meaningful, and accepted validity studies in the field. 
No one has shown me [the experts] error rate, the times she has 
been right, and the times she has been wrong. There is no aca-
demic field known as handwriting analysis. This is a field that 
has little efficacy outside of a courtroom. There are no peer reviews 
of it. Nor can one compare the opinion reached by an examiner 
with a standard protocol subject to validity testing, since there are 
no recognized standards. There is no agreement as to how many 
similarities it takes to declare a match, or how many differences it 
takes to rule it out.173 
Thus, according to Judge Gertner, one thing is clear: when [the ex-
pert] says, I conclude that [the defendant] wrote the robbery note, 
she may well be going beyond her expertise.174 
 Notwithstanding Judge Gertners opinion in Hines, there appears 
to be no consistent application of the Daubert (or any other) factors in 
assessing the reliability of handwriting expert testimony in the wake 
of Kumho. Interestingly, however, it does appear that Kumho has 
caused courts to re-examine the admissibility of traditionally admis-
sible nonscientific evidence, such as handwriting analysis. In re-
sponse, courts have fashioned unique admissibility remediesas 
                                                                                                                      
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 70. 
 171. Id. (emphasis added). 
 172. See id. at 69. 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. Id. at 70. 
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seen in the Hines approach: similarity testimony, permissible; con-
clusory testimony, impermissible. In the end, it appears that Kumho 
has injected uncertainty into a previously stable area of law. 
V.   QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS AFTER KUMHO 
 In Kumho, Justice Breyer purportedly clarified the Supreme 
Courts view as to how Daubert applies to nonscientific expert testi-
mony. Specifically, the Court held that Dauberts general gatekeep-
ing obligation applies not only to testimony based on scientific 
knowledge, but also to testimony based on technical and other spe-
cialized knowledge.175 The Court further stated that trial courts may 
consider one or more of the Daubert factors if doing so will help de-
termine that testimonys reliability; but the test of reliability is flexi-
ble, and Dauberts list of specific factors neither necessarily nor ex-
clusively applies to all experts or in every case.176 Also, the district 
court has broad latitude in determining reliability.177 Seemingly in-
creased judicial responsibility and discretion do provide flexibility for 
the trial judge regarding the admission of nonscientific testimony
but at what cost? 
A.   Flexible Evaluation: A Breeding Ground for Inconsistency 
 If you crave definitive tests and checklists, Kumho is a disap-
pointment. Kumho leaves it to the district court to determine what 
factors are relevant in assessing the reliability of nonscientific expert 
testimony in a particular case.178 The major problem with the Kumho 
decision, however, is that it offers little guidance for district courts to 
use in exercising their newly granted gatekeeping powers for nonsci-
entific expert testimony. More judicial discretion would seem to ac-
count for more uncertainty for litigants and certainly more wiggle 
room for overzealous advocates. 
 The Author contacted two recognized experts in the field of hand-
writing analysis, and both identified unpredictability as the primary 
                                                                                                                      
 175. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See supra Part III.A.3. The Kumho Court gave an example of how this flexible ap-
plication of Daubert might open the door for the admissibility of novel, yet well-founded, 
expert analysis: 
It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made 
by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the par-
ticular application at issue may never previously have interested any scientist. 
Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of Dauberts general acceptance fac-
tor help show that an experts testimony is reliable where the discipline itself 
lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any so-called gener-
ally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy. 
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151. 
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fallout of Kumho.179 The lack of an objective standard for applying 
the Daubert factors (or other reasonable reliability criteria) defies the 
laws basic goalto make the outcome of a Daubert hearing more 
predictable. Inconsistent processes will undoubtedly yield inconsis-
tent results.180 
B.   Unbridled Discretion? 
 Kumho grants district courts the same broad latitude in how the 
courts make reliability determinations as it grants with respect to 
the district courts ultimate admissibility determination (i.e., abuse of 
discretion).181 But this deferential standard, often compounded by 
harmless error analysis, makes trial decisions on the admissibility of 
nonscientific expert testimony virtually unreviewable.182 Absent total 
disregard of the reliability determination, under Kumho, a trial court 
will rarely suffer reversal for abuse of discretion. Moreover, this 
standard will do little toward further clarifying proper application by 
appellate courts of the Daubertor any otherfactors to nonscien-
tific expert testimony, particularly if the appellate courts choose to 
pass on reviewing the trial courts decision by making a harmless 
error determination and/or finding no abuse of discretion. What is 
most unfortunate, however, is that this standard will likely promul-
gate a variety of processes and results, which could possibly concern 
admissibility of the very same expert witness testimony.183 
                                                                                                                      
 179. Telephone Interviews with Farrell Shiver and Tom Vastrick, both Certified Fo-
rensic Document Examiners (Nov. 19-21, 1999). Aside from acknowledging a new uncer-
tainty in whether their testimony would be admissibledepending on the court consider-
ing the admissibility of such testimonyboth experts also acknowledged a need to go to 
court more often to defend the handwriting analysis profession, despite that such testi-
mony has traditionally been admissible for a long, long time. Id. 
 180. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia cautions the district courts against abusing 
their newfound flexibility in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability. See Kumho, 
526 U.S. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring) ([T]he discretion [the Court] endorses . . . is not 
discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function . . . [and] it is not discretion to perform the 
function inadequately.). 
 181. See Kumho, 526 U.S. 142 (citing General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 
(1997) (stating that courts of appeals are to apply the abuse-of-discretion standard when 
reviewing the district courts reliability determination)). 
 182. Kumho gives the trial court the discretion to short circuit many expert evidentiary 
objections in run-of-the-mill litigation by its express invitation to trial courts to take judi-
cial notice of the reliability of well-established methodologies in appropriate circumstances. 
See id. at 152. 
 183. Finally, in the wake of Daubert/Kumho:  
[M]otions to preclude expert testimony have become something of a cottage in-
dustry. . . . So-called Daubert motions have had the unintended negative side 
effect of encouraging costly satellite litigation and delaying the ultimate resolu-
tion of the case on the merits. That trend is likely to continue until the courts 
take steps to restore the balance between admissibility and reliability that 
Daubert advocated. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire missed 
an opportunity to do so. 
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C.   Gatekeeping or Goaltending? 
 Overly restrictive gatekeeping, however, may be selling the jurors 
abilities short and depriving juries of valuable information that could 
help to reach a correct verdict. This is particularly true with regard 
to nonscientific expert testimony, which, by its very nature, is purely 
experience-based and not based on abstract scientific principles. Un-
like scientific expert knowledge, the reliability of nonscientific 
knowledge is not validated by external testing, but rather by consid-
ering the soundness of the methodology and principles on which the 
testimony is baseda task that the jury is just as qualified as the 
trial judge to conduct.184 Judges are laypersons as well, and there is 
no inherent reason to believe that the layperson on the bench is more 
competent at dealing with nonscientific issues than the laypersons in 
the jury box.185 
 Furthermore, by applying arbitrary and inconsistent factors to de-
termine the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony, the trial 
judge may be keeping evidence from the jury and ultimately infring-
ing upon a criminal defendants constitutional right to a jury trial.186 
The primary reason for recognizing a defendants right to a jury trial 
is to protect against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge:187 
[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions 
reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official 
powera reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and 
liberty of the citizen to one judge . . . . The deep commitment of the 
Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a de-
fense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
. . . .188 
                                                                                                                      
Edward D. Cavanagh, Decision Extends Daubert Approach to All Expert Testimony, 71 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 9, 20 (Aug. 1999). 
 184. Although several of the arguments in this section might apply to all experts, the 
Author is not, by any means, advocating the abdication of the judges role as gatekeeper for 
expert testimony that relies on scientific principle, test or methodology. Scientific knowl-
edge is difficult, if not impossible for the juror to evaluate. Moreover, scientific knowledge, 
by its very nature implies an infallibility not found in pure opinion testimony, and thus 
carries with it the tremendous potential to conclusively persuade a jury. 
 185. In 1968, the Supreme Court said: 
[J]uries do understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in most of 
the cases presented to them and [] when juries differ with the result at which 
the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the 
very purposes for which they were created and for which they are now em-
ployed. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968). 
 186. In Duncan, 391 U.S at 157-58, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees a right to jury trial in all serious criminal 
cases. 
 187. Id. at 156. 
 188. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, where the de-
fendants life and liberty are in the balance, is too fundamentally im-
portant to risk the arbitrary and inconsistent exclusion of potentially 
valuable expert testimony from the ears of the jury. 
 Moreover, any unduly rigorous exercise of the judges gatekeeping 
function would inexorably lead to evaluating witness credibility and 
weight of the evidence, the ageless role of the jury.189 Judicial gate-
keeping should not prevent the jury from hearing expert testimony; 
rather, judges should focus on assisting the jury in carrying out its 
constitutional duty: 
It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body.190 It 
weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the 
credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the 
ultimate conclusion as to the facts. . . . [I]ts function is to select 
from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it 
considers most reasonable. That conclusion, whether it relates to 
negligence, causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ig-
nored.191 
 The newly assumed role as gatekeeper for nonscientific expert tes-
timony means more trial review and undoubtedly more exclusions, 
leaving the jury with less information and significantly impacting 
the jurys responsibility as the trier of fact. The trial courts gate-
keeping function should not expand the trial judges role, but rather 
assist the jury in fulfilling its responsibility.192 
VI.   ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE 
 Given the overall dearth of guidance Kumho provided to trial 
judges, the district court should make the reliability and admissibil-
ity determination of nonscientific expert testimony with a full range 
of options in mind. Otherwise, the court might exclude evidence that 
should have been admitted. Accordingly, the following approach pro-
                                                                                                                      
 189. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995) (declining to ele-
vate [trial judges] to the role of St. Peter at the gates of [H]eaven, performing a searching 
inquiry into the depth of an expert witnesss soulseparating the saved from the 
damned). 
 190. The Constitution provides: 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, then accord-
ing to the rules of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 191. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944). 
 192. The Author notes one benefit of a strong judicial gatekeeper: It might lessen the 
battle of the experts. For example, if the district court in Kumho had allowed Carlsons 
testimony, Kumho Tire surely would have countered with its own expert to refute Carlson. 
This, however, seems hardly a justifiable reason to keep valuable evidence from a jury
whose responsibility as fact-finder is constitutionally mandated. 
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vides a structured analysis for the trial court to apply in determining 
reliability of nonscientific expert testimony, while safeguarding the 
constitutional right to trial by jury. 
 First, if the proffered nonscientific expert testimony concerns a 
conclusive issue in the case (e.g., matching one handwriting sample 
to another), then a stricter set of reliability standards should apply, 
starting with each of the four Daubert factors. Second, the trial court 
should be required to record its findings and, if necessary, explain 
why any of the Daubert factors do not apply to the particular ex-
pert.193 Moreover, if the trial judge decides to depart from Daubert, he 
should be required to articulate reasons for adopting the new 
reliability tests used.194 This approach seems consistent with Justice 
Scalias concurring opinion in Kumho, where he indicated that it 
might indeed amount to an abuse of discretion if the trial court fails 
to apply one or another of [the Daubert factors].195 
 But where testimony is such that the jury will be left to make the 
ultimate conclusion (e.g., the expert is only comparing handwriting 
samples and pointing out similarities and differences), the trial court 
should employ a less rigorous gatekeeping function. Also, under this 
scenario relevant testimony from a qualified nonscientific expert 
should be presumptively admissible when the expert does not draw 
explicit conclusions regarding the facts at issue, unless the opponent 
comes forward with substantial evidence that the experts opinion is 
mere speculation or subjective belief.196 A presumption of admissibil-
ity is consistent with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and would minimize abuse.197 
 Practically speaking, requiring a district court to conduct a reli-
ability inquiry whenever a party utters a Daubert/Kumho objection 
to a proposed expert invites abuse. A full-scale Daubert/Kumho 
hearing can be an expensive proposition, requiring additional court 
time, transportation of the testifying expert, supporting documenta-
tion and, possibly, supporting experts. A party should not be permit-
ted to force an opponent into a disadvantageous settlement, or to de-
ter individuals from pursuing their legal rights in the first place, by 
imposing unnecessary expense absent evidence of genuine reliability 
                                                                                                                      
 193. The Author notes that the trial judge may, at this point, want to appoint an ex-
pert under FED. R. EVID. 706 to enhance the courts ability to reach a correct reliability de-
termination. 
 194. The Fifth Circuit advanced this approach in Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 
308, 312 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 195. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 159 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 196. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 
MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1367 (1994). 
 197. In Daubert, the Court recognized the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and 
their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony. 509 U.S. 
at 588, (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
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concerns. Having a presumption of admissibility would require the 
opponent to come forward with specific evidence challenging the reli-
ability of the proffered expert.198 
 Here, as previously discussed, other mechanisms, such as cross-
examination, rebuttal testimony, jury instructions, and note tak-
ing,199 would provide a sufficient check on the reliability of the non-
scientific expert testimonywithout risking the danger of excluding 
useful evidence from the jury. Cross-examination, in particular, can 
be a vitally important means of ensuring reliability of nonscientific 
expert testimony, where the witness typically relies on her own per-
sonal knowledge and experience, rather than on scientific theories 
not discernable in the courtroom.200 Indeed, the Daubert Court recog-
nized that [v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-
tional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evi-
dence.201 Moreover, the Hines court noted that cross-examination 
and limiting instructions are more effective in nonscientific fields be-
cause they are more accessible to the jury, than fields with the cha-
risma of science.202  
 Other potential remedies for a court dealing with questionable 
nonscientific expert testimony include: appropriate jury instructions 
regarding the use of the experts testimony;203 a directed verdict un-
                                                                                                                      
 198. Note that the adversarial approach would likely benefit the judge and permit him, 
ultimately, to make a more informed gatekeeping determination. 
 199.  See generally Sandra Day OConnor, Juries: They May Be Broke, but We Can Fix 
Them, FED. LAW., June 1997, at 20, 23-24; Development in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1503-11 (1997). 
 200. In Kumho, objections that Carlsons expert opinion was unreliable did not focus on 
the underlying principle that causes of tire failure can be ascertained by visual inspection, 
but rather on Carlsons application of that principle, which could have been probed 
through cross-examination and rebuttal. For example, opposing counsel could have high-
lighted to the jury the dismal condition of the tire in question (i.e., severely worn tread, 
improperly repaired punctures, etc.) and, as such, lead them to draw their own conclusion 
regarding the reliability of Carlsons testimony. See Kuhmo, 526 U.S. 137, 141-45 (1999). 
 201. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
 202. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 67. The Eighth Circuit also recognized the value of vigor-
ous cross-examination of the nonscientific expert in refusing to find that the district court 
abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of an accountant. See Forklifts of St. 
Louis, Inc. v. Komatsu Forklift, U.S.A., Inc., 178 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1999); see also 
Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Inter-
national Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Emerson Intl, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 
1988) ([T]he fact that an experts testimony may be tentative or even speculative does not 
mean that the testimony must be excluded so long as opposing counsel has an opportunity 
to attack the experts credibility.). 
 203. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (noting that evidence about the phases of the moon 
may be valid for one purpose, but not for another purpose). Federal Jury Instructions re-
garding expert witness opinion evidence also give explicit directions to the jury regarding 
expert testimony: You may accept or reject it, and give it as much weight as you think it 
deserves, considering the witnesss education and experience, the soundness of the reasons 
given for the opinion, the acceptability of the methods used, and all the other evidence in 
the case. Criminal Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit. 
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der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) if there is no legally suffi-
cient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to reach a different con-
clusion;204 a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) if the jury has been unduly swayed by 
the questionable expert testimony;205 in some cases, remittitur;206 and 
possibly even some form of statutory gatekeeping.207 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 No one wants the charlatan expert in the courtroom, but lumping 
all experts togetherbe they scientific or nonscientificunder the 
Daubert regime of reliability has enormous potential for causing con-
siderable chaos in the federal courts. Kumho fails to provide any con-
sistent methodology as to when, where, and how to employ Daubert 
factors to nonscientific testimony, and the genuine likelihood exists 
that different federal trial courts in different jurisdictions will re-
solve similar matters involving the same nonscientific expert testi-
mony in diametrically opposed ways. As applied, Kumho seems to 
work best with nonscientific expert evidence with scientific under-
pinnings, while it appears to work least well with nonscientific ex-
pert evidence based purely on experience. Inconsistent processes will 
surely yield inconsistent results. 
 Furthermore, the very nature of nonscientific expert testimony, 
which is based on personal experience, observations, skills, training, 
                                                                                                                      
 204. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). The Daubert Court recognized this procedure, known as di-
rected verdict before the 1991 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as an 
appropriate method for dealing with questionable expert testimony: [I]n the event the 
trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insuf-
ficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, 
the court remains free to direct a judgment . . . . 509 U.S. at 596. 
 205. Id. 
 206. In Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 
for example, the jury was unduly swayed by an expert economists testimony that, in retro-
spect, should not have been admitted into evidence. The district judge thus offered remitti-
tur. Id. at 1414. 
 207. Some form of statutory gatekeeping seems better than arbitrary and inconsis-
tent application of factors by judges in the different jurisdictions to the same or similar ex-
perts. The Florida Legislature, for example, has enacted special limitations on the qualifi-
cations of experts in medical malpractice actions. Section 766.102(2)(c)2, Florida Statutes, 
provides that an expert who is not a similar health care provider may testify to the appro-
priate standard of care in medical malpractice actions when the expert is qualified as a 
result of practice or teaching in the specialty of the defendant or practice or teaching in a 
related field of medicine . . . within the 5-year period before the incident giving rise to the 
claim. Id. 
 In actions for damages involving a claim of negligence in providing emergency medical 
services, section 766.102(6)(a), Florida Statutes, limits the expert testimony from persons 
who have had substantial professional experience within the preceding 5 years while as-
signed to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department. It is 
conceivable, however, similar statutory gatekeeping criteria could be developed for the 
more common types of nonscientific expert testimonyyielding more predictability and 
consistency in the admission of such testimony. Id. 
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etc.and not on complex scientific principlesmakes it more condu-
cive to evaluation by the jury. However, the newly assumed role as 
gatekeeper for nonscientific expert testimony means more trial re-
view and undoubtedly more exclusionsleaving the jury with less in-
formation and coming dangerously close to infringing upon the tradi-
tional and constitutional obligation of the jury as the sole trier of 
fact. With precious little guidance provided to the gatekeepers re-
garding admissibility of nonscientific evidence, what may be good for 
scientific expert testimony may not necessarily be good for nonscien-
tific expert testimony. 
 
